A homonymy analysis is proposed to explain the so-called “demonstrative use” of personal pronouns. This analysis explains why some pronouns (_it_) do not allow a demonstrative use, as demonstrated in Nunberg (1993). The absence of a demonstrative feature in _it_ can also account for the fact that it does not allow deferred reference. It is argued on the basis of the structure of the nominal demonstrative paradigm that the homonymy analysis is more parsimonious than a single-item analysis.

The literature on demonstratives mostly focuses on DPs (demonstrative pronouns and determiners), which denote in the entity domain. However, demonstratives can also belong to other categories and denote in the domains of manners _(she acted like this/like that/thus_), locations (_she was here/there_), degrees (_she was yay tall_), amounts (Russian: _ona vypila stolʲko vody_ ‘she drank that_much water’), qualities (Russian: _ona uže pila takoe vino_ ‘she drank that_kind_of wine’), and even times (_she arrived then_). The problem I address is twofold. How (...) can we define a unified semantics for these expressions that incorporates a single concept of demonstration, yet allows denotations to vary across domains? And how can we make sense of demonstrative feature values such as proximal or distal in domains that have no spatial component, such as degrees or manners? I argue that the solution comes from a generalized application of the familiar phenomenon of deferred reference: all demonstrative reference outside the entity and (possibly) spatial domains is deferred. (shrink)

One takes advantage of some basic properties of every homotopic $\lambda$-model (e.g. extensional Kan complex) to explore the higher $\beta\eta$-conversions, which would correspond to proofs of equality between terms of a theory of equality of any extensional Kan complex. Besides, Identity types based on computational paths are adapted to a type-free theory with higher $\lambda$-terms, whose equality rules would be contained in the theory of any $\lambda$-homotopic model.

The intention here is that of giving a formal underpinning to the idea of ‘meaning-is-use’ which, even if based on proofs, it is rather different from proof-theoretic semantics as in the Dummett–Prawitz tradition. Instead, it is based on the idea that the meaning of logical constants are given by the explanation of immediate consequences, which in formalistic terms means the effect of elimination rules on the result of introduction rules, i.e. the so-called reduction rules. For that we suggest an extension (...) to the Curry– Howard interpretation which draws on the idea of labelled deduction, and brings back Frege’s device of variable-abstraction to operate on the labels (i.e., proof-terms) alongside formulas of predicate logic. (shrink)

In this paper I shall venture into an area with which I am not very familiar and in which I feel far from confident; namely into phenomenology. My main motive is not to get away from standard, boring, methodological questions like those of induction and demarcation; but the conviction that a phenomenological account of the empirical basis forms a necessary complement to Popper's falsificationism. According to the latter, a scientific theory is a synthetic and universal, hence unverifiable proposition. In fact, (...) in order to be technologically useful, a scientific hypothesis must refer to future states-of-affairs; it ought therefore to remain unverified. But in order to be empirical, a theory must bear some kind of relation to factual statements. According to Popper, such a relation can only be one of potential conflict. Thus a theory T will be termed scientific if and only if T is logically incompatible with a so-called basic statement b, where b is both empirically verifiable and empirically falsifiable. In other words: T is scientific if it entails ¬b; where b, hence also ¬b, is an empirically decidable proposition. (shrink)

G. E. M. Anscombe; I *—The Presidential Address: Existence and Truth, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 1–12, http.

Early work from a leader in analytic philosophy From Parmenides to Wittgenstein, Volume 1: Collected Philosophical Papers is part of a multi-volume publication of G.E.M. Anscombe's collected works. Writing on philosophy of mind, philosophy of action, philosophy of language, and philosophical logic, Anscombe is known as one of analytical Thomisms's most prominent figures. This collection includes her writing on the work of her teacher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, with whom she worked closely as co-editor and translator.

Wegner (2002) fails to (1) distinguish conscious will and voluntariness; (2) account for everyday willed acts; and (3) individuate thoughts and acts. Wegner incorrectly implies that (4) we experience acts as willed only when they are caused by unwilled thoughts; (5) thoughts are never true causes of actions; and (6) we experience ourselves as first performing mental acts which then cause our intentional actions.

The question of the essence of contemporary socialist artistic culture is being acutely posed today, in the period of renewal of the whole life of Soviet society. To what extent does the method of socialist realism, which has become established in our theory and practice, correspond to the processes taking place within art? Is its method adequate for an all-round reflection and analysis of the entire diversity and uniqueness of today's society? After all, the method of socialist realism presumes a (...) truthful, historically concrete depiction of reality in its revolutionary development, i.e., it orients the artist toward reflecting that reality only in "forms of life" and requires him to represent only progressive processes. (shrink)

In the past, hypothesis testing in medicine has employed the paradigm of the repeatable experiment. In statistical hypothesis testing, an unbiased sample is drawn from a larger source population, and a calculated statistic is compared to a preassigned critical region, on the assumption that the comparison could be repeated an indefinite number of times. However, repeated experiments often cannot be performed on human beings, due to ethical or economic constraints. We describe a new paradigm for hypothesis testing which uses only (...) rearrangements of data present within the observed data set. The token swap test, based on this new paradigm, is applied to three data sets from cardiovascular pathology, and computational experiments suggest that the token swap test satisfies the Neyman Pearson condition. (shrink)